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STUDENT ARTICLES
IS IT JUSTIFIED? - THE DEATH PENALTY AND
MENTAL RETARDATION
JAMIE MARIE BILLOTTE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The fact that a defendant is mentally retarded has played a
disturbingly insignificant role in the American system of capital
punishment. For mental retardation to constitute a defense to a
crime, the mental retardation must be almost totally disabling.'
Nevertheless, 89% of mentally retarded people are mildly
retarded2 and thus not totally disabled by their disease. Yet, this
does not make them equal to the rest of society in reference to
criminal culpability, especially with reference to capital punish-
ment. This essay will not suggest that mentally retarded people
cannot be held criminally liable in any case. Rather, this paper
will suggest that capital punishment as imposed on mentally
retarded persons is not morally justified.
To exempt mentally retarded defendants from capital pun-
ishment would be my recommendation for resolving the moral
dilemma associated with the execution of mentally retarded
defendants. Nevertheless, such an option has not been widely
accepted. Of the thirty-six states that have a death penalty stat-
ute,' only two, Georgia and Kentucky, have completely exempted
* B.A. 1991, University of California at Los Angeles; Candidate forJuris
Doctorate 1994, Notre Dame Law School; Thos. J. White Scholar 1992-94. I
would like to dedicate this article to my parents, James and Sherry Billotte, for
their unconditional support of my academic pursuits. I would also like to thank
Professor John Robinson for the time and effort he has put into my education
at Notre Dame. Finally, I would like to thank my fiance Paul Moses for
believing in me.
1. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 432 (1985). Ellis and Luckasson are
considered experts in the area of mental retardation.
2. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENrAL DISORDERS 40 (3rd. ed. 1980).
3. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS . . . THE DEATH
PENALTY: A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 227 (1989).
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mentally retarded defendants from the death penalty.4 The
other states have determined that mental retardation is only a
mitigating factor rather than a defense. The presence of a com-
plete defense would exclude this group of people from the death
penalty.5 They would not be exempt, however, from other forms
of punishment such as life imprisonment. There is, however, no
such defense in the majority of the states and thus whether the
execution of mentally retarded defendants is morally justified
must be addressed.
Over the years, there have been many debates about the role
that insanity plays in a defendant's actions, but there has been
limited discussion regarding the significance of mental retarda-
tion upon the culpability of a criminal defendant. While insanity
may be a temporary mental illness, mental retardation is
predominantly a permanent mental disability. The key differ-
ence between mental illness and mental retardation is that
"mentally ill people encounter disturbances in their thought
processes and emotions; mentally retarded people have limited
abilities to learn."6 Consequently people with average or high
intelligence can be mentally ill, while most mentally retarded
people are not mentally ill.
7
Such a distinction is significant. Mental retardation affects
the very tool necessary to obtain knowledge - the ability to
learn. With a limited learning ability, the mentally retarded
defendant has difficulty synthesizing all of the information
presented to him in his lifetime. A mentally retarded person can
learn and comprehend information. It is more difficult, how-
ever, than if he was not retarded. This learning process may take
years longer for a retarded person than a non-retarded person.
In this article I will argue that this feature of retardation leads
inevitably to the conclusion that mentally retarded people should
not be considered culpable of a capital offense.
In light of Enmund v. Florida8 and Tison v. Arizona,9 the
mental state required to deserve death is intent to kill or reckless
4. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Michie 1993) (the Georgia Legislature
passed this statute in response to a public uproar over the execution of Jerome
Borden, a mentally retarded defendant, as noted in the Amicus Brief in Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1987)); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.150 (Michie 1989).
5. Donald H.J. Hermann et al., Sentencing of the Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendant, 41 Apx. L. REV. 765 (1988). See e.g., Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463,
1467 (4th Cir. 1985), Trimble v. Maryland, 478 A.2d 1143, 1145-47 (Md. 1984),
Berryhill v. State, 221 S.E.2d 185, 186 (Ga. 1975).
6. Ellis & Luckasson supra note 1, at 424.
7. Id. at n.53. See also FRANK MENOLASCINO, CHALLENGES IN MENTAL
RETARDATION: PROGRESSIVE IDEOLOGY AND SERVICES 126-27 (1977).
8. 458 U.S. 782 (1986).
THE DEATH PENALTY AND MENTAL RETARDATION
indifference towards the possibility of death. Both states of mind
require knowledge of the probable consequence of one's
actions.1 0 Understanding what may happen as a result of one's
action or inaction is achieved through learning. If the ability to
learn is impaired then so is the ability to understand the conse-
quences of any given action. Mentally retarded people should
not be as easily or readily subject to a punishment which requires
knowledge of the consequences of one's actions as the founda-
tion for guilt."i
The previous statement assumes that our present legal sys-
tem seeks to punish only those that are truly culpable and in pro-
portion to their culpability. Those who commit the criminal act
with a culpable mental state 2 will be punished. If a system pun-
ished the criminal only because of his act and not also because of
his state of mind, then whether executing mentally retarded per-
sons is morally justified would be a moot debate. Our system,
however, does attempt to punish the guilty mind as well as the
guilty act and thus the moral questions surrounding the death
penalty and mental retardation are necessary.
In this essay, I will argue that the execution of mildly or
moderately mentally retarded defendants is morally unaccept-
able." To determine whether some action is morally acceptable,
one must examine the purposes behind the action and then
9. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
10. BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARv 809, 1270 (6th ed. 1990). (Intent is a state
of mind in which a person seeks to accomplish a given result through a course
of action. Recklessness is the state of mind accompanying an act, which either
pays no regard to its probably or possibly injurious consequences, or which
though forseeing such consequences, persists in spite of such knowledge.)
11. In Enmund, 458 U.S. 782 (1986), the Supreme Court suggested the
requisite state of mind to deserve death was intent. "Enmund did not kill or
intend to kill and thus his culpability differs from that of the robbers who
killed." Id. at 798. The defendant must have intended, contemplated or
anticipated that lethal force would or might be used. In Tison, 481 U.S. 137
(1987), however, reckless indifference was held to be a sufficient state of mind
for a capital defendant. Although Tison weakened the holding of Enmund in
that the state of mind necessary for the death penalty was lessened, in reference
to mentally retarded defendants, Tison supports the contention that mentally
retarded defendants may not be deserving of death. Recklessness requires that
the defendant be aware of the consequences of his actions but disregard or be
indifferent to them. Retarded persons may not be as able as nonretarded
persons to contemplate the consequences of their actions and subsequently
disregard them and thus may not be deserving of death.
12. Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
13. Of course this presupposes that capital punishment is an acceptable
means of punishment. Since that is an entirely separate issue, it will not be
discussed here. Furthermore, this essay will not address the issue of capital
punishment and severe mental retardation because it is in the areas of mild and
19941
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assess the moral justifiability of achieving that end by the means
at issue. Consequently, each of the purposes for punishment will
be discussed briefly with emphasis on the role that each purpose
plays in capital sentencing. Additionally, each purpose will be
discussed with reference to the execution of mentally retarded
defendants. The bulk of this essay, however, will focus on the two
penological interests that are thought to be best served by the
death penalty; general deterrence and retribution.14 Although
capital punishment may be justified for some non-retarded
defendants, this essay will argue that there is no justification for
the execution of a mentally retarded defendant.
II. WHY IS THIS AN ISSUE?
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held that the exe-
cution of mentally retarded criminals is constitutionally
allowed. 5 The court opined that as long as the jury is aware of
mitigating factors such as the defendant's mental retardation, a
jury's finding of guilt sufficient to warrant death is allowed. In
Penry the defendant raped and fatally stabbed a woman. Before
her death the woman described her assailant to the police. The
police suspected Penry had committed the crime while on parole
from a conviction on a previous rape charge. Penry confessed to
the crime.
Penry was diagnosed with an I.Q. of between 50 and 63
(moderate to mild retardation) and a mental age of a six and
one half years old. Penry was found to be competent to stand
trial. Penry's defense was a claim of insanity. The state was able
to present evidence that showed that Penry was sane at the time
of the crime. The defense, by using the insanity defense, risked a
finding that Penry was sane although mentally retarded. Insanity
and mental retardation are two distinct phenomena and a per-
son can be sane and mentally retarded, insane and not mentally
retarded, etc. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury
instructions were such that Penry's mental retardation did not
play a significant role in the decision process. Because of that
and not because of the debate surrounding the execution of
mentally retarded defendants, the Supreme Court remanded the
moderate mental retardation where the mental capabilities of the retarded
mind are greatly misunderstood.
14. The Supreme Court has stated that the only two penological interest
furthered by capital punishment are deterrence and retribution. See Enmund,
458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
15. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See generally EMILY FABRYCKI
REED, THE PENRY PENALTY. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION (1993) (book was published as this article went to print).
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case. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not attack the consti-
tutionality of the execution of mentally retarded people.
As roughly estimated in 1988, 250 of the 2,000 persons then
on death row were mentally retarded. 6 Furthermore, it is
believed that five of the seventy executions between 1976 and
1990 were performed on mentally retarded defendants.1 7 Based
on these numbers, approximately twelve percent of current
death row inmates are retarded, and approximately seven per-
cent of those who have been executed in the past fifteen years
have been retarded. Such numbers are significant due to the
fact that less than five percent of the American population is
mentally retarded.18
III. ELEMENTS OF CAPITAL HOMICIDE
In the thirty-six states that permit defendants to be sen-
tenced to death, the trier of fact must determine whether the
elements of capital homicide have been met. The trier of fact
may consider such mitigating factors as allowed for in the crimi-
nal code of that state. If the trier of fact determines that all the
elements of a capital homicide are present and there are no miti-
gating factors that would dissuade the trier of fact from imposing
a sentence of death, a defendant, both retarded and non-
retarded, will be sentenced to die.1 9
In Penry, the jury was instructed that if the answers to all of
the following questions were yes, then the defendant could be
sentenced to death. The jury was asked, "(1) whether [the
defendant's] conduct was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that death would result, (2) whether
there was a probability that he would be a continuing threat to
society, and (3) whether the killing was unreasonable in response
to any provocation by the victim."20 Many state statutes are
worded similarly.21 A defendant may be sentenced to death if
16. John Blume, Representing the Mentally Retarded Defendant, THE
CHAMPION 32 (Nov. 1987).
17. Juliet L. Ream, Capital Punishment for Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It
Morally and Constitutionally Impermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. REv. 89, 103 (1990).
18. In 1979-80 several states reported that less than one percent of the
school age population was mentally retarded. Five states reported that the
percentage was between three and four. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFCE,
DISPARITIES STILL EXIST IN WHO GETS SPECIAL EDUCATION 72 (1981).
19. Except in Georgia and Kentucky were mentally retarded defendants
are exempt from the death penalty.
20. 492 U.S. at 302.
21. See MAss. ANN. LAwS ch. 265, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1993); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-21 (1993); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 60.06 (Consol. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.3 (Baldwin 1993).
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the defendant acted deliberately and unreasonably and would
continue to be a threat to society. Acting deliberately, however,
is not the only way that a defendant may be sentenced to death.
In Tison v. Arizond2' the Supreme Court held that reckless
indifference to human life is a culpable mental state sufficient to
deserve death. In Tison, the defendant, after helping his father
escape from prison, watched his father murder a family of four.
The defendant did not participate in the murder but also did not
help the victims. The defendant drove away from the scene of
the crime with his father in the victims' car. Although the
defendant did not kill anyone, he was convicted of felony-murder
due to his reckless disregard for the victims' lives.
For a defendant to be sentenced to death, the sentencer
must conclude at least that the defendant intended to kill the
victim and knew that the victim could die, or was reckless and
acted without justification, excuse, or in the heat of passion. This
essay will not suggest that mental retardation presents an excuse
or justification for a mentally retarded defendant's actions. Men-
tally retarded people can commit criminal acts and be deserving
of punishment. I will argue, however, that mentally retarded
people do not have the abilities necessary to act with the degree
of culpability sufficient to deserve death. Thus, capital punish-
ment, as imposed on mentally retarded defendants, is
unacceptable.
IV. MENTAL RETARDATION
Mental retardation is characterized by significantly low intel-
ligence and by difficulty with such adaption skills as cognition,
communication and impulse control. 3 Intellectual ability is
defined with reference to intelligence quotient (IQ) scores. The
ability of IQ tests to determine correctly a person's intelligence is
hotly debated.24 Many believe that the tests are 'culturally and
socioeconomically biased. A standard IQ test is divided into vari-
ous subsections designed to test particular abilities. The "Per-
formance" subset is made up of picture completion, object
assembly, block design and mazes. The "Verbal Scale" subset is
made up of similarities tests, digit span tests, and vocabulary.2"
22. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
23. The American Association on Mental Retardation defines mental
retardation as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
developmental period." AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY,
CLASSwICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION I (H. Grossman ed., 1983).
24. See ROGERS ELLIOT, LITIGATING INTELLIGENCE (1987).
25. Id. at 80-81.
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The greater part of an IQ test does not cover materials taught in
a basic school curriculum. 6 Rather, the questions are open-
ended and susceptible to multiple answers. Example questions
are "Give two reasons why most people would prefer an automo-
bile to a bicycle" and "In what way are a snake, cow and a sparrow
alike?"27 For lack of a better measure of one's intelligence, how-
ever, IQ tests are still taken and used to compare people's
intelligence.
The average IQ is 100 and those that are substantially below
the average are declared mentally retarded. The upper bound-
ary of mental retardation is 70.28 Those below an IQ of 70 are
further divided into four categories. An individual with an IQ of
50-55 to 70 is considered mildly retarded. Someone with an IQ
of 35-40 to 50-55 is moderately retarded. Severely retarded per-
sons have an IQ between 20-25 and 3540. Those with an IQ
below 20-25 are profoundly retarded.29
Although most mentally retarded people are mildly retarded
it is important to remember that "mild" retardation is still retar-
dation and should not be considered just a mild mental disorder.
AsJames Ellis and Ruth Luckasson point out, "[j]udges and other
criminal justice personnel unfamiliar with this classification
scheme may find the labels of 'mild' and 'moderate' to be euphe-
mistic descriptions of individuals at those levels of disability." °
Nevertheless, the term 'mild' as used to modify retardation is in
reference to other levels of retardation not to average mentality.
Consequently, a mildly retarded person has substantially defi-
cient mental capabilities as compared to the average person.
Mental retardation is not determined solely by an intelligence
quotient. In order for a person to be declared mentally
retarded, his lower intellectual functioning ability must be
accompanied by "significant limitations in an individual's effec-
tiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning, per-
sonal independence, and/or social responsibility that are
expected for his or her age level and cultural group, as deter-
mined by clinical assessment and, usually, standardized scales.""
Consequently, by its very definition, mental retardation demonstrates
a lack of ability to perform as most people are expected to perform. This is
an important factor when dealing with mentally retarded people
and the criminal justice system.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 144.
28. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 422.
29. Peny, 492 U.S. 302, 308 (1989).
30. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 423.
31. Id. at 422.
1994]
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V. PURPOSES FOR PUNISHMENT
Before discussing the morality of executing mentally
retarded defendants, we must examine the purposes for punish-
ment in our legal system. Whether or not an action is morally
justified depends on the reasons and motivations behind such
action. The purposes behind the American system of punish-
ment have changed through the years. Based on the purpose
espoused by our courts and legislatures at any particular time,
the acceptance of the death penalty as a form of punishment has
varied. If the dominant purpose for punishment is rehabilitation
then the death penalty, which has no rehabilitative effect, cannot
be an appropriate means of punishment. Nevertheless, if retri-
bution is the dominant purpose, capital punishment serves such
a purpose. Consequently, it is helpful to know what purposes are
given for punishing convicted defendants so that the appropri-
ateness of capital punishment with respect to the mentally
retarded can be fully analyzed.
There are six standard purposes for punishment; general
deterrence, specific deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, inca-
pacitation, and denunciation. Often a particular punishment sat-
isfies more than one purpose. Whether a punishment is morally
acceptable, however, depends on more than just whether it
achieves one of these purposes. For example, children are con-
sidered incapable of possessing the moral culpability required to
justify death. Such a determination considers not only the pur-
pose for punishment but whether such punishment can be justi-
fied. If only the purpose was considered, then under the general
deterrent and denunciatory theories, children could be sen-
tenced to death. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court
has determined that the execution of children is not accepta-
ble, 2 and that decision is itself morally sound. Whether a pur-
pose is achieved is different from its being justified. For
example, denunciation is achieved by executing a child criminal;
society expresses its disgust with the criminal's actions. The exe-
cution of a child, however, is not justified by denunciation
because the child may not deserve to die and the need for society
to denounce the child's actions is not sufficient justification to
warrant his death.
Of the six purposes for punishment, four cannot contribute
to the justification of capital punishment. Although capital pun-
ishment does specifically deter a criminal, it is too severe a pun-
ishment to inflict on a criminal in order to stop him from
32. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding that execution
of those under the age of 16 is unconstitutional).
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committing a crime again. Capital punishment is incapacitating
but incapacitation envisions that the criminal will return to soci-
ety after a period of incarceration. An execution does denounce
a criminal but death is too severe a punishment just to reassure
law abiding citizens that law breakers are punished. Further-
more, rehabilitation must have a living criminal to rehabilitate.
Only general deterrence and retribution can truly contrib-
ute to the justification of the death of a criminal defendant.
General deterrence occurs when the punishment of one person
discourages others from criminality. Retribution occurs when a
culpable person is punished as he deserves. Retribution places a
ceiling on any form of punishment; only those that truly deserve
to be punished will be punished and only those that deserve to
be punished severely will be punished severely. Retribution may
also put a floor under punishment by allowing for all who have
done wrong to get the punishment that they deserve.
A. Purposes Which Cannot Justify Capital Punishment
1. Specific Deterrence
The need to protect society from repeat offenders can be
achieved by capital punishment. Specific deterrence is achieved
if a punishment deters offenders from committing their crimes
again. Specific deterrence may be justified if the criminal
deserves to be punished and such punishment will deter that
criminal from committing his wrong again. Specific deterrence,
however, is not justified to the extent it over-deters a wrongdoer.
a. Specic Deterrence and Capital Punishment
Insofar as specific deterrence is a purpose for punishment,
then the type of punishment and the severity of that punishment
must be determined with reference to specifically deterring a
specific criminal from acting in a criminal manner again. If a
punishment will deter a criminal from acting criminally again
then with reference to specific deterrence the use of punishment
might be justified. How severe the punishment is, however, is
the factor that determines whether it is justified. If it is found
that only at a certain level or higher the criminal will be
deterred, then the use of that punishment will achieve specific
deterrence. If it is found that the criminal deserves the severity
of the punishment then it is justified. This serves as a retributive
cap on specific deterrence. Even if specific deterrence helpsjus-
tify punishment in some instances, specific deterrence cannot
contribute to the justification of capital punishment. There is no
room for a criminal to be deterred due to his punishment once
1994]
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he is dead. Capital punishment does achieve the deterrent effect
of specific deterrence; an executed individual will not commit his
offense again. The severity issue, however, is not served. We can-
not have a justification that focuses on the after-the-punishment
behavior of the criminal if the criminal is not living. Specific
deterrence is based on the assumption that once the criminal is
punished he will not commit another wrong because of his fear
of punishment. Without the criminal, however, there can be no
specific deterrence. Although specific deterrence, understood as
preventing a criminal from committing a crime again, may be
achieved through capital punishment, it cannot justify capital
punishment.
Besides the fact that specific deterrence cannot apply to an
executed criminal, the research in the area of murderers and
repeat offenses demonstrates that this group of criminals is sig-
nificantly less likely to repeat their offense than are several other
classes of criminals. The threat of repeat offenses by those
deemed to deserve death is low. Researchers have found that
among offenders released on parole, convicted murderers are
one of the least likely groups to repeat their offenses.3" Hugo
Adam Bedau found that over a 76 year period in twelve states
only twelve of 2,646 murderers were convicted of committing
murder again after being released.34 Similarly, Thorsten Sellin
reported a study in which 56,265 inmates were released on
parole and participated in a three year follow up. Of the 56,265
released, 6,835 had been convicted of willful homicide. Of these
parolees, 310 committed a new offense but only twenty-one had
committed murder. In fact, Sellin found that those who commit-
ted armed robbery, aggravated assault and rape were more likely
to commit murder when released than were convicted
murderers.3 5
Such a low recidivism rate suggests that capital punishment
is not the only form of punishment that would serve to prevent
most repeat murders by released murderers. Longer jail terms
could serve to prevent repeat offenses also. The Bedau and Sel-
lin studies do show that some convicted murderers did repeat
their crimes and thus long jail terms may not prevent all possible
repeat offenses if convicted murderers are released on parole.
We would, however, have to execute all murderers or incarcerate
33. See HUGO A. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (1982);
THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1982).
34. BEDAU, supra note 33, at 175-76.
35. See generally SELLIN, supra note 33.
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them for life in order to guarantee that no one murderer would
repeat her crime.
Intolerable as a single incident of murder is, murder after
murder, each committed by the same malefactor is exponentially
more intolerable. Specific deterrence can, therefore, in princi-
ple play a role in the justification of severe punishment for first
offense murderers and desert based considerations would set a
very high ceiling on how severe that punishment might be. How
severe that punishment should be is the difficult question. If it
could definitely be shown that only execution will deter murder-
ers from murdering again, the case for capital punishment would
be substantially strengthened. Other forms of punishment, how-
ever, effectively reduce recidivism among murderers. Capital
punishment is not the only means to that end. Life imprison-
ment can reach the same ends as capital punishment; barring an
escape, the convicted criminal will not be able to commit his
crime again against society. Although there is the risk that the
offender may kill in prison, research has shown that most
murders committed in the prison system are not committed by
convicted murderers.36
Thorsten Sellin's research on homicides committed in
prison is insightful. Sellin compiled information from forty-one
of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia and the Federal
Bureau of Prisons for 1967. In total thirty-one homicides were
reported in the year studied. Five of the thirty-one homicides
were committed by former murderers while sixteen (over 50%)
were committed by those in jail for property crimes. Thus
there is a dilemma. We should not execute those who commit
property crimes just because they might be likely to murder once
they are out of jail. Furthermore, we should not execute con-
victed murderers in order to deter them from murdering again if
there is proof that such a repeat offense is rare. Our society will
not kill all property-related criminal defendants even though
they are more likely to murder after released than are convicted
murderers. Yet, our society will allow the execution of murder-
ers, who are less likely to repeat their crime, based on the belief
that they may murder again.
Similarly, those who are caught committing check fraud are
more likely to repeat their offense than murderers yet the death
penalty would not be an appropriate punishment for such
36. See SELLIN, supra note 33;James E. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorenson,
A National Study of the Furman-Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from
Capital Offenders, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 5 (1989).
37. See SELLIN, supra note 33.
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offenders. A sentence of death for those that commit check
fraud would be considered cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment, and monumental debate has raged for
over a decade regarding the appropriateness of a life sentence
for non-violent recidivists."8 Although recidivism rates are very
high with those that commit check fraud, and it appears that it
takes a large punishment to deter them, the idea that execution
would be an appropriate punishment is against sound moral
judgment. Check fraud criminals do not deserve to die for their
crime and thus even if only capital punishment could keep
check-writers from check-writing, it cannot be justified under the
retributive cap. Specific deterrence functions in the justification
of a particular form of punishment where, and only where, the
one being punished deserves that form of punishment. In the
next section of this essay, I will show why a mentally retarded
defendant may not deserve a particular punishment although it
may specifically deter him.
b. Specific Deterrence and Mental Retardation
Because mentally retarded offenders do not deserve capital
punishment, specific deterrence based considerations cannot
function defensibly in its justification for them. Mental retarda-
tion may in fact aggravate the circumstances of a crime, rather
that mitigate them, in capital sentencing because of the incom-
plete knowledge that the American legal system has about
mental retardation. Since mental retardation affects the defend-
ant's ability to learn and to control his impulses, a sentencer may
conclude that a mentally retarded defendant will not be deterred
from future action by any finite punishment. Consequently, the
defendant would be perceived as- a greater risk to society and
thus death would be appropriate. "It appears to us that there is
all the more reason to execute a killer if he is also ... retarded.
Killers often kill again; [a] retarded killer is more to be feared
than a ... normal killer. There is also far less possibility of his
ever becoming a useful citizen. " " But this understandable per-
ception is in fact mistaken. Research has shown, however, that
"recidivism rates for the retarded offender are not unlike those
38. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). See Harmelin v. Michigan,
111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) and Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) for more on the
Rummel debate.
39. Upholding Law and Order, HARTSviLLE MESSENGER, June 24, 1987, at 5B.
This comment was made in support of a South Carolina court's death sentence
imposed on a mentally retarded defendant.
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of the so-called normal offender."4" Consequently, retarded
offenders show no greater risk of recidivism than other offend-
ers; and as shown above, non-retarded murderers are not likely
to commit murder again.
One could also argue that a mental retardate's lack of
impulse control could cause him to be more dangerous to soci-
ety. Nevertheless, there is modern evidence that "the incidence
of criminal behavior among people with mental retardation does
not greatly exceed the incidence of criminal behavior among the
population as a whole."41 As early as the 1950's, authorities
agreed that "no significant link existed between mental retarda-
tion and criminality. "42
Individuals with mental retardation have "rigid thought
processes that lead to a difficulty or failure to learn from mis-
takes, resulting in counterproductive behaviors."4" Although this
might appear to support the contention that mentally retarded
defendants would be likely to repeat their crimes, what it really
demonstrates is the fact that mentally retarded people are differ-
ent from other offenders. Specific deterrence should be used to
prevent those that have chosen to act anti-socially from choosing
to act anti-socially again. Most mentally retarded people have dif-
ficulty, however, understanding that what they have done is not
acceptable behavior. That a mentally retarded offender may not
be deterred in a manner similar to a non-retarded offender is not
evidence of the retarded offender's malice or bad character.
Specific deterrence is not an appropriate purpose for punish-
ment with reference to mentally retarded defendants.
2. Incapacitation
Incapacitation is intended to make it impossible for a crimi-
nal to hurt society during the time of the defendant's incapacita-
tion. It is defined as "the effect of isolating an identified
offender from the larger society, thereby preventing him or her
40. Ravenel & Bush, A Legal Framework: An Outsider's Perspective, in
REHABILITATION AND THE RETARDED OFFENDER 73 (1976). See also Biklen &
Minarcik, Criminal Justice, Mental Retardation and Ciminality, A Causal Link ?, 10
MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 172 (1978).
41. Biklen & Minarcik, supra note 40, at 172.
42. HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CIMINAL DEFENSE 385
(1954).
43. John J. McGee & Frank J. Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants
with Mental Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in RONALD W. CONLEY ET AL.,
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION 58 (1992).
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from committing crimes in that society." 44 By taking a criminal
out of the community, we are preventing him from harming soci-
ety during the time that he is incarcerated. By "isolating" the
criminal, incapacitation contemplates that the criminal will
someday return to society but for a time being he is absent from
society. The length of one's absence from his community is
dependent on the crime he has committed and the likelihood
that he might commit that crime again.
a. Incapacitation and Capital Punishment
Although capital punishment is an obvious method of inca-
pacitating a person, a better means of incapacitating an offender
is to incarcerate him. Incarceration is a much better form of
incapacitation than the death penalty in part because it allows for
the correction of the injustices that are possible in any system of
punishment. Although the American legal system is founded on
the belief that an individual is innocent until proven guilty, not
every person 'found' guilty is guilty. The case of Roger Coleman
is a good example.45
Coleman was found guilty of rape and capital murder. The
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. On his state habeas
corpus claim, the Circuit Court ruled against him. The filing of
an appeal thirty-three days instead of thirty days after the Circuit
Court ruling, gave the Virginia Supreme Court grounds for deny-
ing his petition. Again the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. It was not until after his federal habeas corpus peti-
tion was denied by the federal district and the Court of Appeals
levels that the Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard his
federal habeas claim. Through out the eight years that it took to
conclude Coleman's case, evidence supporting his innocence
grew.46 The possibility that he committed the rape and murder
was tenuous. The Supreme Court, however, addressed the issue
of federal habeas review rather than Coleman's innocence. Cole-
man may have been innocent but he has already been executed
and thus the issue is moot. If an innocent person is found guilty
and executed, an innocent life is taken.
A further problem with capital punishment as a means of
incapacitating a criminal is that there are many ways that the
44. National Academy of Sciences Panel on Research on Deterrent and
Incapacitative Effects, Measuring Deterrence and Incapacitation, in HYMAN GROSS &
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, SENTENCING 228 (1981).
45. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
46. John Tucker, Dead End, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 4, 1992, at 21-25.
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criminal justice system can be manipulated. Plea bargains in co-
defendant cases, although helpful to a prosecutor, may cause
one defendant to get a lighter sentence while the other may get a
more severe sentence.47 In a capital crime in which two or more
persons are involved, one may be used against the other. In
return for helping the prosecution, the one with the plea bargain
lives and the other dies. Such a manipulation of the system does
incapacitate both persons but one dies while the other gets a
reduced jail term (and his life). Although I do not suggest that
we should stop using plea bargains, I do suggest that because we
do use and need them we should be careful with the punishment
we inflict on those who do not benefit from the prosecution's
deals.
The case of Charlie Brooks, Jr. demonstrates the need for
caution when dealing with co-defendants and plea bargains.
Brooks and his accomplice were charged with murder in the
commission of a felony, they were thus eligible for the death pen-
alty.48 Neither one would admit to pulling the trigger and the
state was unable to prove which of them was the triggerman.
Brooks' accomplice received forty years in jail due to a plea bar-
gain while Brooks was executed in 1982. A few months after
Brooks' execution, the Supreme Court ruled that the death pen-
alty was disproportionately severe for a non-triggerman accom-
plice in such felony murders and was thus cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.49 Unfortunately for
Brooks, this ruling was too late. Although capital punishment is
incapacitating, it is also irrevocable. In an imperfect system such
permanency is dangerous. A better alternative is life imprison-
ment without parole.
Incarceration, although a much better punishment than
capital punishment, is not a punishment that should be inflicted
without discretion. "The loss of liberty is itself a great depriva-
tion. And confinement works a dramatic change in the quality of
the person's existence . . -5" It remains true, however, that
given our fallibility, incarceration is a better form of incapacita-
tion. But even if capital punishment does incapacitate effectively
in most cases, in the case of mentally retarded defendants, only
imprisonment can be a justified form of incapacitation.
47. U.S. v. Mazzaferro, 865 F.2d 450, 457-60 (1st Cir. 1989) (the
defendant, who refused to plea bargain, was sentenced to three concurrent 20
year sentences while the more culpable co-defendants were sentenced to one 10
year term).
48. MICHAEL E. ENDRES, MORALITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 20 (1985).
49. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
50. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOINGJUSTICE 109 (1986).
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b. Incapacitation and Mental Retardation
As weak as the incapacitative rationale is with respect to the
death penalty generally, it is weaker still with respect to the exe-
cution of a mentally retarded person. In that case, incarceration
is a better form of incapacitation than execution because of the
possibility of errors in our criminal justice system. Our criminal
justice system is not perfect. There is room for error in any crim-
inal prosecution and sentencing. That combined with the lim-
ited knowledge of mental retardation and the possible prejudices
toward mental retardates, supports the assertion that incarcera-
tion is better than execution for such people. In fact, incarcera-
tion may actually benefit the retarded defendant. Due to the
difficulty that mentally retarded defendants may have with their
learning abilities, incarcerating a mentally retarded criminal may
serve to help educate the criminal. A mentally retarded defend-
ant may grow to understand why he has been taken away from his
home or school and placed in a prison and thus may appreciate
the consequences of his actions.
Although a benefit may result form the incarceration of
mentally retarded defendants, it should not be imposed lightly
on them even if it were to be the severest punishment allowed.51
Mentally retarded defendants have a more difficult time in
prison than non-retarded defendants. "Mentally retarded per-
sons meet with unremitting hardships in prison."52 Further-
more, mentally retarded inmates are more likely to be victimized,
exploited53 or injured54 than other inmates.
For both retarded and non-retarded defendants, incarcera-
tion is a better form of incapacitation than capital punishment.
The likelihood that a mentally retarded person will be victimized
in the prison system, however, suggests that incarcerating a men-
tally retarded defendant requires particular attention. Important
factors such as prison type (maximum vs. minimum security) and
population (repeat offenders vs. first time offenders) must be
considered in the sentencing process. Because juries and judges
are more likely to punish mentally retarded defendants in excess
51. If, for example, mentally retarded people were exempt from capital
punishment.
52. Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1344 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
53. "Inmates with low intelligence levels are prime targets for
exploitation. Consequently, they are peculiarly in need of special protection
from physical, emotional, sexual, and financial abuse at the hand of others." Id,
54. "Mentally retarded prisoners are markedly and abnormally prone to
receive more injuries than the average inmate. Some of their injuries occur on
the job; others are suffered at the hands of other inmates or security officers."
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of their desert, we need to be especially careful to police the
retributive ceiling in these cases.
3. Denunciation
Another purpose for punishment is denunciation. Denunci-
ation is achieved when punishment serves as a "conventional
device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indigna-
tion, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the
part of either the punishing authority himself or of those 'in
whose name' the punishment is inflicted."55 A crime is "conduct
which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and
solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the com-
munity."56 Punishment serves as an expression of the commu-
nity's disgust for certain action. The greater the disgust the
harsher the punishment.
To understand denunciation based approaches to the justifi-
cation of punishment, it is important to recall that we customa-
rily think of the state - and not the private individuals - as the
inflictor ofjustified punishment." Social contract theorists pro-
vide us with a way of thinking through the importance of this
"fact." The social contract symbolizes the human's transition
from nature into a society in which each member agrees to the
rules set forth in the social contact.58 Thus, each member has a
duty to obey the rules, when they are not obeyed, society has a
right to denounce such actions through punishment. The social
contract is important to denunciation because if the community
does not denounce those who flagrantly breach the contract,
then the commitments made by others in the social contract
have no contractual force. If one could violate the contract with-
out notice, then others would have no contract-based incentive
to comply with it.
55. JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 98 (1970).
56. Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, LAw AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 23 (1958).
57. "Society is the proper entity to inflict the punishment because it was
the victim of the crime." Ronald R. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A
Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REv. 299,
301 (1990).
58. "[T]he social contract.. .is reducible to the following terms: Each of
us puts in common his person and his whole power under the supreme
direction of the general will; and in return we receive every member as an
indivisible part of the whole." J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (1792)
reprinted inJ.J. RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN
OF INEQUALrIY 18-19 (L. Crocker ed., 1967).
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a. Denunciation and Capital Punishment
There is no greater way to denounce one's actions then to
execute him. Inflicting severe pain without killing might be
viewed as a better form of denunciation because the criminal
would have to live through and after the pain. Public condemna-
tion, however, is as much a part of punishment as is pain.
"Indeed the condemnation plus the added [unpleasant physical]
consequences may well be considered, compendiously, as consti-
tuting the punishment."59 Thus public condemnation is central
to punishment. Executing a criminal is the severest form of pub-
lic condemnation that we now allow ourselves. Taking the life of
one who breaks the law says to society that such action is not
acceptable and will not be tolerated.
Walter Berns advocates a denunciatory justification for pun-
ishment. Berns justifies punishment through the concept of
community. Every member of a community is required to obey
the law and those who do not do so injure not only their victim
but the entire community.6" Denunciation is a moral justifica-
tion because the anger and indignation that a community feels
when someone is a victim of a crime is part of what makes it a
moral community. Capital punishment, Berns argues, is neces-
sary to punish murderers in order to express the anger and
indignation of the community and restore its moral integrity.
Thus,
[t]he criminal law must be made awful, by which I mean,
awe-inspiring, or commanding profound respect or rever-
ential fear. It must remind us of the moral order by which
alone we can live as human beings, and in our day the only
punishment that can do this is capital punishment.61
Denunciation could be achieved through capital punish-
ment. Denunciatory punishment serves as a way for those who
obey the laws to express anger at those who do not obey the laws.
Whether we are justified in taking the life of the criminal in
order to give us - the noncriminal members of society - an
avenue for expressing our indignation is doubtful. The criminal,
although breaking the law, does not deserve to lose his life just to
make the other members of society feel better. There are other
forms of punishment that can sufficiently express condemnation
59. Rychlak, supra note 57, at 337-38.
60. "[The criminal] has called into question the very possibility of that
community by suggesting that men cannot be trusted freely to respect the
property, the person, and the dignity of those with whom they are associated."
WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 155 (1982).
61. Id. at 173 (Emphasis in original).
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without taking the life of the criminal. Without any other pur-
pose, such as general deterrence or retribution, the denuncia-
tion theory is not sufficient to justify death.
Some have argued that denunciation is similar to retribu-
tion;6" both look to the moral culpability of the offender and
punish accordingly. Nevertheless, advocates of denunciation
suggest that, unlike retribution (and the other purposes for pun-
ishment), denunciation focuses on the law abiding citizen rather
than the law breaker. Denunciation serves to confirm law abid-
ers in their inclination to obey the law and to regard law break-
ing as reprehensible. Denunciation does not, however, focus on
the criminal himself and thus is not justified with reference to
either non-retarded people or retarded people because capital
punishment is too severe of a punishment just to provide society
with a means to express its anger. Even if a denunciation-based
justification of capital punishment is sometimes successful, it will
fail in the case of the mentally retarded defendant for the rea-
sons that I will develop presently.
b. Denunciation and Mental Retardation
There is always a possibility that people could be mistakenly
or excessively punished. Denunciation-based accounts of punish-
ment present it as allowing society to condemn those who fla-
grantly breach the social contract and to reassure society that the
contract will be enforced. Such a purpose can be achieved by
punishment on any wrongdoer. With such a result based justifi-
cation, the fact that a defendant is mentally retarded may play an
insignificant role. Punishment expresses disgust with criminal
action. The criminal act is the focus. There is no denying that
some mentally retarded people commit criminal acts. Such acts
are repudiated by society and thus will be denounced. Some of
those who commit these acts, however, may not be as culpable as
some others.
Where denunciation is not capped by retribution, mentally
retarded people may be executed for their criminal conduct
although they do not deserve to be punished as severely as non-
retarded criminals. Denunciation cannot justify capital punish-
ment for retarded defendants because it is unjust to take a
human's life so that society may express its anger at him when
the person being executed lacks the capacity for full culpability.
There must be more than society's need to express itself tojustify
execution.
62. SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 178-91
(4th ed. 1983).
19941
352 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLJC POLICY (Vol. 8
4. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is often considered a purpose for punishment
when it is really a benefit (if achieved) of punishment. The other
purposes presented in this essay gain support by the benefit they
produce for society. Although a rehabilitated criminal will be a
benefit for society, a rehabilitated criminal has also gained some-
thing from his punishment; the ability to function legally in
society.
Rehabilitation has been a part of the American legal system
for over a century; this is evident through the use of "correction"
to modify many parts of our punishment system.6" Rehabilita-
tion gained much of its influence in the criminal system due to
the belief that criminal activity was caused by antecedent socio-
economic factors more than by rational choice. Researchers like
Cesare Lombroso64 and Enrico Ferri6" suggested that the correla-
tion between crime and socioeconomic, psychological and physi-
ological preconditions was too significant to ignore. Ferri argued
that factors such as poverty, inequality, injustice, lack of educa-
tion, poor nutrition, broken homes, etc. caused criminal behav-
ior. Such factors are greatly influenced by forces that the
individual has no control over. The criminal, on this account, is
to some extent a victim of a disease of society. Consequently,
what criminals need is treatment not punishment; if the system
can identify the cause of deviant behavior, then the system can
also counteract it or so the theory says.
Rehabilitation is intended to help convicted criminals
become better people; to restore them to law-abiding, function-
ing status. Such hope has diminished in priority, however, as it
has became evident that the American prison system cannot
house all convicted criminals or provide the environment neces-
sary for rehabilitation.66 At first glance, statistics suggest that the
only area where the prison system is rehabilitating is with mur-
63. For example, the California Department of Corrections is part of the
Youth and Adult Correctional Agency. JOHN C. CULVER &JOHN H. SYER, POWER
AND POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA 277 (4th ed. 1992); also consider the Central
Correctional Institution in Columbia, North Carolina. John Blume & David
Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Death: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41
ARK. L. REv. 725, 726 (1988).
64. CESARE LOMBROSO, CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1911) (H.
Horton trans. 1968).
65. ENRICO FERRI, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY (1917).
66. ENDRES, supra note 48, at 68. See also Ramsey Clark, Summary Report on
New York Parole, CITIZENS' INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC. 5
(March 1974); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 55
(1968) ("[w]e do not know how to rehabilitate offenders").
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derers.67 This apparent rehabilitation could be attributable to
many factors other than an organized rehabilitation program
and thus it is far from certain that the prison system is rehabilitat-
ing. Imprisonment for rehabilitative purposes may be just a way
of preventing the criminal from committing criminal activity
again.
a. Rehabilitation and the Death Penalty
The death penalty prevents any rehabilitation. An executed
person cannot be rehabilitated. "Death is irrevocable; life impris-
onment is not. Death, of course, makes rehabilitation impossi-
ble; life imprisonment does not."6' The death penalty is unique
in its "rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose
of criminal justice. And it is unique ... in its absolute renuncia-
tion of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity." 69 It is
important to note that there are many defendants that may be
sentenced to death although they are first time offenders. If
there is any rehabilitation possible in our penal system it is with
first time offenders. Such rehabilitation is impossible if the crim-
inal is executed. Similarly, rehabilitation may be a likely benefit
of punishing a mentally retarded defendant. As with non-
retarded defendants, capital punishment prevents any rehabilita-
tion for mentally retarded defendants.
b. Rehabilitation and Metal Retardation
Because no one can be rehabilitated by death, it follows trivi-
ally that, mentally retarded people cannot be rehabilitated by
capital punishment. Out of the capital punishment context,
however, rehabilitation appears to be a desirable side-effect of
punishment. Punishing mentally retarded people through con-
finement would be a better form of punishment if it could help
mentally retarded offenders function in society.70 Rather than
executing retarded murderers, we should incarcerate them and
67. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("There is also a substantial body of data showing that the existence of the
death penalty has virtually no effect on the homicide rate in prisons. Most of
the persons sentenced to death are murderers, and murderers tend to be
model prisoners.") Id. at 352.
68. Id. at 346.
69. Id. at 306 (StewartJ. concurring).
70. Habilitation, rather than rehabilitation, is the most desirable result of
punishment. This is not to suggest that habilitation will correct all of the
problems facing a mentally retarded person. Habilitation, however, will help
mentally retarded offenders to understand what they have done and why such
actions are criminal. Habilitation will result in a functioning, mentally retarded
person not a functioning, non-retarded person.
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help them to function in society as law abiding citizens. To date,
however, rehabilitation has not been effective for mentally
retarded people in the penal system. In order to function in soci-
ety after being released, that person must have experienced ade-
quate and appropriate training, rehabilitation, and work
programs. Those who have done extensive research on the edu-
cation provided in correctional facilities have concluded that it is
less than adequate.7 Education, however, is important for men-
tally retarded people. Many of the factors that make mentally
retarded people different with reference to criminal culpability
could be improved with proper education. 72
Mental retardation professionals have determined that
"habilitation" (rather than rehabilitation) is the appropriate cor-
rectional scheme. Habilitation is designed to prepare a mentally
retarded individual to function in society. Rehabilitation
attempts to restore a person back to a functioning member in soci-
ety. Thus, the emphasis is different; habilitation starts at the
most basic concepts and expands as those concepts are under-
stood. Rehabilitation presupposes that everyone knows the
basics and thus they will not be taught. Since habilitation is a
vital concept to the punishment of mentally retarded people, its
meaning should be clearly articulated:
Habilitation is the process by which the staff [of an institu-
tion] assists individuals to acquire and maintain those life
skills that enable them to cope more effectively with the
demands of their own persons and environments and to
raise the levels of their physical, mental, and social func-
tioning. Habilitation includes, but is not limited to, pro-
grams of formal, structured education and treatment.73
Habilitation would provide the mentally retarded person with
the skills that he did not have before he was convicted." If the
mentally retarded person were to acquire these skills then he
would be more likely to function as a law-abiding citizen.
71. See generally John Noble & Ronald W. Conley, Toward and Epidemiology
and Relevant Attributes, in RONALD W. CONLEY ET AL. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION 42-45 (1992).
72. This does not mean, however, that mentally retarded people can be
executed once they are educated. Rather, a good education in prison may help
to ameliorate certain deficiencies but cannot totally correct them.
73. ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR SERVICES FOR MENTALLY RETARDED AND
OTHER DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS, STANDARDS FOR SERVICES FOR
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED INDIVIDUALS 21-22 (1984).
74. It would be unfortunate if the education system in the correctional
centers was better than in the pure educational centers. Hopefully the
habilitative approach will become the dominant theory in educating mentally
retarded people at all levels.
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Neither rehabilitation nor habilitation is a justification for
punishment. It is, however, easy to use rehabilitation and habili-
tation as justifications when one has difficulty justifying punish-
ment on other grounds. If the criminal will benefit from the
punishment then the punishment begins to look more accepta-
ble. Since our present penal system cannot rehabilitate
criminals, however, punishing someone so that he may be reha-
bilitated is unjustified. Our penal system does not have the
resources necessary for total rehabilitation, and the resources are
even more limited with reference to habilitation of mentally
retarded criminals. Although rehabilitation and habilitation are
desirable results of punishment, the likelihood that they will
occur is minimal.
Of the six purposes for punishment, four cannot justify the
use of capital punishment on non-retarded defendants. Even if
such purposes could be found to be justified with non-retarded
offenders, they could not be justified with mentally retarded
criminals. Specific deterrence is unjustified because a mentally
retarded person may not be able to understand that her actions
resulted in her punishment and that if she wanted to avoid pun-
ishment she must not act in than manner again. Incapacitation
cannot justify capital punishment because incarceration is a
much better form of incapacitation taking into account the
problems with our criminal justice system and the retributive cap
that must be placed on all punishment. Denunciation does not
justify capital punishment because death is not an appropriate
means of allowing law abiders to express their disgust with
criminals. Finally, capital punishment has no rehabilitative
effect. Only general deterrence and retribution could possibly
justify capital punishment.
B. Purposes Which Can Justify Capital Punishment
General deterrence and retribution, as purposes for punish-
ment, do not consider the criminal after he is punished. Rather,
general deterrence focuses on a punishment's effect on society
and retribution focuses on what the criminal deserves once he
commits a crime. Neither justification considers what happens
to the criminal once he is punished. Advocates of punishment
often seek to justify it by reference to these two considerations
together.75 We have punishment they say, to deter others, and
we inflict punishment on the criminal because he deserves it. If
culpability was not present, punishing an individual to help the
rest of society would not be acceptable. "While deterrence
75. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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accounts for why punishment is socially useful, desert is necessary
to explain why that utility may justly be pursued at the offender's
expense."76
With general deterrence the severity of punishment is deter-
mined by many factors including desert and the need to deter
others from committing particular crimes. The more heinous
the crime, the greater the need for deterrence; hence the more
severe the punishment can be. With retribution, the more hei-
nous the crime, the more the criminal deserves to be punished;
hence the more severe the punishment can be. With thinking
such as this, capital punishment would appear to be a natural
consequence of committing the most awful of crimes. General
deterrence, with a retributive cap, has the greatest appeal to
those who support capital punishment. All of society benefit
from the punishment of the criminal and the criminal deserved
to be punished because of his culpability. The two justifications
together should prevent an unjust punishment because society's
need for the punishment is constrained by the need for the crim-
inal to be culpable. Thus, capital punishment could be justified
when these two factors - general deterrent efficacy and desert
- are present. Such justification is limited, though, to non-
retarded offenders. Even if capital punishment can be justified
by general deterrence and retribution, capital punishment of
mentally retarded defendants cannot be justified by these
purposes.
1. General Deterrence
Punishment is justified in part by a need to protect society
from criminal activity. General deterrence is the effect on y and
z of punishing x for an offense that y and z, like x, are inclined to
commit, where the effect is that y and z refrain from criminality
because of their desire to avoid the punishment that x has suf-
fered. The fear that one's actions will result in punishment is the
driving force behind the general deterrent justification.
It is important to distinguish general deterrence from spe-
cific deterrence. General deterrence is concerned with deterring
others from committing a criminal act by punishing a particular
wrongdoer. Specific deterrence focuses on the criminal actor
and whether he will commit his criminal act again. Thus, general
deterrence is not concerned with the criminal once he has been
punished. What is important is whether his punishment will
deter the rest of society from acting criminally. Although repeat
offenses are future criminal activity which society wishes to pre-
76. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, supra note 50, at 51.
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vent, the general deterrentjustification does not address whether
a punishment prevents repeat offenses. General deterrence
looks to potential offenders to determine if a form of punish-
ment is a deterrent. 77
a. General Deterrence and Capital Punishment
Insofar as capital punishment has deterrent efficacy, it serves
to protect society from the worst forms of violent criminal activ-
ity. By executing convicted criminals, it is argued, some others
who may be tempted to commit a violent crime in the future will
be deterred. The fear that one's actions may or will, if one is
convicted, result in death is the general deterrent argument for
the death penalty.
Isaac Ehrlich is quoted often for his studies on the deterrent
effect of capital punishment. Ehrlich found that every execution
prevented eight additional murders.79 Ehrlich studied data from
over 37 years taking into account various socioeconomic factors
such as the percentage of non-whites in the population, the per-
centage of families with income less than one half the median
family income for the state, the percentage of the population
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four, and the percentage
of urban population compared with rural population."0 Ehrlich
also took into account the probability of arrest, conviction and
execution.8" Ehrlich used a two-state multiple regression proce-
dure in order to determine the effect that capital punishment
had on the murder rate. 2
Ehrlich's research, however, was widely contested because
he did not consider such crucial variables as private gun owner-
ship, 3 rural to urban migration, 84 and length or prison
sentences for convicted murderers.8 " Without such variables,
Ehrlich's study only showed the deterrent effect of execution on
77. Id. at 38-39 (1986).
78. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATED OF AMERICA - THE DEATH
PENALTY 162 (1987).
79. Isaac Erhlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of
Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 414 (1975).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. WILLIAM J. BowERs, LEGAL HOMICIDE 308 (1984).
83. Gary Kleck, Capital Punishment, Gun Ownership and Homicide, 84 AM. J.
OF Soc. 882 (1979).
84. David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, Statistical Evidence on the Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment: A Comparison of the Works of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac
Erhlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170. (1975).
85. Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral
Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177 (1981).
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the homicide rate. Ehrlich's study could not be used to show the
difference between the deterrent effect of capital punishment
and the deterrent effect of longer jail terms or life imprison-
ment. Consequently with Ehrlich's findings called into ques-
tion," the incremental deterrent effect of capital punishment
over life imprisonment remains highly suspect. There is very lit-
tle proof that general deterrence is better served through the
implementation of capital punishment as opposed to life without
parole. Many studies on capital punishment and its relation to
the homicide rate have been unable to show an incremental
deterrent effect on crime due to the use of executions as punish-
ment. Researchers have found that although certainty of punish-
ment has a deterrent effect, capital punishment itself does not,87
at least not one significantly greater than life imprisonment.
Two such researchers are Charles Title and Alan Rowe.
Title and Rowe concluded that in areas with the greatest likeli-
hood of arrest, the crime rate is lower than in areas where arrest
is not likely.88 Most researchers, however, who have found a simi-
lar relationship between certainty of arrest and the crime rate
emphasize that the certainty of arrest must be at a minimum of
30% for there to be a deterrent effect on the crime rate.89 Fur-
thermore, and most important for our purposes, the severity of
the punishment seems to have little effect in those areas with less
than a 30% arrest rate and only a slight effect in those areas with
a greater than 30% arrest rate.9 ° Finally, research has shown that
probability of arrest and promptness of punishment are greater
deterrents than severity of punishment.91
86. There was so much debate surrounding Erhlich's work that the
National Academy of Sciences Panel on Deterrence and Incapacitation
conducted a thorough study of Erhlich's findings. The Panel concluded "we
see too many plausible explanations for his finding a deterrent effect other
than the theory that capital punishment deters murder .... [his] results cannot
be used at this time to pass judgment on the use of the death penalty." Klein et
al., The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assessment of the Estimates, in
ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE
EFFECrs OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 358 (1978).
87. ENDRES, supra note 48, at 81.
88. Charles Title & Alan Rowe, Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates: A Further
Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis, 52 Soc. FORCES 455 (1974).
89. Charles Logan, On Punishment and Crime: Some Methodological
Commentary, 19 SOC. PROBS. 280 (1971).
90. RALPH D. ELLIS & CAROL S. ELLIS, THEORIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A
CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL 20 (1989).
91. Lee McPheters, Criminal Behavior and the Gains from Crime, 14
CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1976).
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It is important to note that the key to these studies is what
the possible criminal perceives.92 If a particular potential
offender believes that she will be arrested and punished
promptly if she commits a particular crime, then, other things
being equal, she will be deterred by the prospect of punishment.
Consequently, perception rather than certainty is what deters
future criminality. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that there
can be no actual punishment and still be deterrence. Rather,
some imposition of punishment is practically necessary if the
threat of punishment is to remain credible. Some believe that
actual certainty is impossible.
Actual certainty of punishment, even if possible, would
surely be far too burdensome and expensive to accom-
plish. Aside from the monetary costs, constitutionally pro-
vided civil rights would have to be forfeited. Accordingly,
if deterrence is dependent on both factors (certainty and
severity), increasing the penalty is the cost-efficient way to
deter crime.9
What all of the views above demonstrate is that there needs
to be both certainty and severity. Although certainty is more
likely to deter crime, if the punishment is a slap on the wrist the
fact that it will definitely be imposed is irrelevant because the
punishment is so minimal. There must be the perception both
that one will be punished and that the punishment will be appro-
priately severe.
Here is the problem with capital punishment when its gen-
eral deterrent efficacy is at issue. A potential criminal in America
today would not perceive that a significant percentage of offend-
ers are executed.94 If severity was all that was needed then the
fact that one could even remotely be executed would be a deter-
rent. Since the certainly of punishment is low in our present
penal system, however, the severity of the possible punishment is
not enough of a deterrent. There is not a perception that capital
punishment is inflicted with any certainty. Rather, what is per-
ceived is short jail sentences and early parole. For there to be a
greater deterrent effect to capital punishment, there must be not
only probability of arrest and prompt punishment but the per-
ceived use of capital punishment on a regular basis and this is
92. ELLIS & ELLIS, supra note 90, at 20.
93. Ronald R. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration
of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REv. 299, 310 (1990).
94. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2697 (1988) (although
discussing the execution of defendants who committed a capital offense while
under the age of 16, the court said that only 1.7% of those arrested for willful
criminal homicide received a sentence of death).
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what, for example, Texas is trying to achieve. 5 Without such a
perception, capital punishment will not be a deterrent.
Whether capital punishment is a general deterrent is highly
questionable. Some researchers have not found a significant
relationship between capital punishment itself and low homicide
rates, but other theories have surfaced which argue that capital
punishment may actually encourage homicide. 6 If that is so
then the death penalty could never serve as a deterrent. Some
researchers argue that a positive correlation between executions
and the homicide rate is due to a "lack of respect for human
life."97 These researchers suggest that the legalization of execu-
tions devalues life and thus does not serve to deter people from
killing others. Still others see executions as having a "brutaliz-
ing" effect and thus encouraging homicide similar to the effects
of public executions or mass murders.98 Cesare Beccaria, an
early student of the death penalty and its deterrent effect, opined
that society had a duty to keep people rational and not let them
revert to their brutish nature. He stated
In proportion as torments become more cruel, the spirits
of men, which are like fluids that always rise to the level of
surrounding objects, become callous, and the ever lively
force of the passions brings it to pass that after a hundred
years of cruel torments the wheel inspires no greater fear
that imprisonment once did .. .. The countries and times
most notorious for severity of penalties have always been
those in which the bloodiest and most inhumane of deeds
were committed, for the same spirit of ferocity that guided
the hand of legislators also rules that of the parricide and
assassin.99
Although these views have not been widely accepted, 100 they do
provide an explanation for the reality that in some states, homi-
cide rates have increased after executions.10 1
95. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct 852 (1993).
96. William J. Bowers & Glen L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What is
the Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME AND DELINQ. 563 (1980); David R. King, The
Brutalization Effect: Execution Publicity and the Incidence of Homicide in South
Carolina, 57 Soc. FORCES 683 (1978); Daniel Glaser & Max S. Ziegler, Use of the
Death Penalty v. Outrage at Murder, CRIME AND DELINQ. 20 (1974).
97. Glaser & Ziegler, Use of the Death Penalty v. Outrage at Murder, CRIME
AND DELINQ. 20 (1974).
98. See supra note 96.
99. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 11 (Henry Peolucci
trans., 1963).
100. ENDRES, supra note 48, at 85.
101. For example, Florida and Georgia. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 3, at 167.
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b. General Deterrence and Mental Retardation
Deterrence assumes that an individual can both predict and
appreciate the consequences of his actions. As the plurality
stated in Gregg v. Georgia,'0 2 whether capital punishment is a
deterrent depends on whether the possibility of execution will
enter "into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act." 103
Thus, one must premeditate in order to be deterred. Neverthe-
less, mentally retarded people may not be able to premeditate
their actions as fully as can people of average intelligence or bet-
ter. Mentally retarded people also have limited impulse con-
trol." 4 A mentally retarded person may not refrain from actions
that he does not realize will result in death. Thus, a retarded
person who has difficulty weighing the consequences of his
actions may not, in some instances, weigh such consequences at
all.10 5 If premeditation requires that a person know and under-
stand the consequences of his actions, then a mentally retarded
person may not be able to premeditate. The Penry decision, how-
ever, holds that a mentally retarded person may be able to pre-
meditate. I, however, argue that since it is not certain that a
mentally retarded person can premeditated, the death penalty is
an unjustified punishment for mentally retarded people.
Mental retardation also has a great effect on information
processing, reactions to events and the planning of alternative
actions. 106 A mentally retarded person may not be able to ana-
lyze a particular course of action and determine that one choice
will lead to a particular result while the other will lead to another
result. As Spritz and Borys have found, when a task requires
planning, mentally retarded people are more likely to fail than
non-retarded persons.'0 7 Planning is crucial to acting deliber-
ately and acting deliberately is crucial to a capital case. Insofar as
a mentally retarded person has enormous difficulty in planning
102. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that the death penalty is not per se
cruel and unusual punishment).
103. Id. at 185-86.
104. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY [now the American
Association on Mental Retardation], CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 16
(H. Grossman ed., 1983).
105. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 429. See also Blume & Bruck, supra
note 63, at 733.
106. SeeJoseph C. Campione & Ann L. Brown, Memory and Metamemort
Development in Educable Retarded Children, in PERSPECTrVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF MEMORY AND COGNITION (Robert V. Kail & John W. Hagen eds., 1977).
107. H.H. Spritz & S.V. Borys, Depth of Search: How Far Can the Retarded
Search Through an Internally Represented Problem Space?, in P.N. BROOKS ET AL.,
LEARNING AND COGNITION IN THE MENTALLY RETARDED (1984).
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then a key element of the prosecution of a capital case is
reduced.
The preceding argument takes into account the retributive
cap that should be placed on all forms of punishment if it is to be
justified. Although on retributive grounds, mentally retarded
people cannot be executed, under general deterrence their exe-
cution may achieve general deterrence. If it can be shown that
the execution of any offender, retarded or non-retarded, does
have an incremental general deterrence efficacy over life impris-
onment, then mentally retarded people along with non-retarded
people can be executed to achieve general deterrence. Thus,
those that are mentally retarded, but are determined to be com-
petent to stand trial, could be executed if "found" to deserve
death. For the majority of mentally retarded defendants such
executions will never be justified by general deterrence if retribu-
tion is considered. The criminal must actually deserve to die in
order for his death to be justified. As argued throughout this
essay, most mentally retarded people do not deserve to die
because they may not have the mental, emotional and psycholog-
ical abilities necessary to act with criminal intent or recklessness.
Advocates of punishment often seek to justify punishment by
both the deterrent and retributive arguments. When the two are
combined, then the deterrent effect of punishment does not
have to be overwhelming. As long as punishment has some
deterrent effect and those that are punished deserve it, it does
not matter that a punishment's deterrent effect is very low. Con-
sequently, if it is determined that a form of punishment can be
even the slightest of a deterrent, then the retributive justification
takes over and all criminals are then punished according to what
they deserve. When this happens, capital punishment can easily
be justified with respect to any killer because of a slight possibility
of general deterrence and because punishment is deserved. Cap-
ital punishment of mentally retarded defendants could even be
justified if only the slightest chance of deterrence is found and
society determines that mentally retarded defendants can
deserve to be executed. Nevertheless, most mentally retarded
defendants do not deserve to be punished. It is to the justification
of that claim that I now turn.
2. Retribution/Deserts
Some argue that punishment is "just" if and only if the crimi-
nal deserves it.108 Retribution is designed to treat culpable per-
108. WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1979) and ERNEST VAN
DEN HAAG & JOHN P. CoNRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY. A DEBATE (1983).
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sons as they deserve. Retribution is a unique justification in that
it focuses on the past behavior of the criminal rather than the
future effect of his punishment. A criminal is punished based on
what he did and what he deserves. A criminal is not punished
based on what society wants or does not want to occur in the
future or what is the best way for society to prevent crimes from
happening again.
Our society, outside of the penal system, attempts to reward
and punish people in a manner quite similar to retribution. We
structure reward and punishment systems in the hope that only
those that deserve rewards will receive them while only those that
deserve to be punished will be punished. When we perceive
these systems as functioning properly, we feel comforted by the
fact that no one gets more or less than they deserve. Retribution,
as applied to our penal system, is a natural human instinct. This
instinct
is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct
in the administration of criminal justice serves an impor-
tant purpose in promoting the stability of a society gov-
erned by law. When people begin to believe that
organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon
criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve," then
there are sown the seeds of anarchy - of self-help, vigilant
justice, and lynch law.1°9
a. Retribution and Capital Punishment
Those who advocate the retributive justification do not
espouse "an eye for an eye" theory. An "eye for an eye" is retalia-
tory thinking which is quite distinct from retribution. Retaliation
involves punishing the criminal for the actus reus alone. Culpabil-
ity is irrelevant to retaliatory thought. Retribution involves pun-
ishing the criminal because he deserves to be punished.
Culpability is crucial to retributive thought. Although retribu-
tion does not require, and the penal system most likely cannot
punish criminals in a similar manner to their crime, i.e., raping a
rapist or killing a multiple murderer more than once, 10 some
retributivists argue that murderers can be punished by being
killed. Ernest van den Haag, for example, suggests that murder-
109. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J.
concurring).
110. ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY
OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 193 (1975).
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ers should be executed because death is the only appropriate
moral response for those who murder.11'
To some, the retributive theory produces some counter-intu-
itive outcomes. For example, if two people, with the same state
of mind, attempt to kill another person and only one of the vic-
tims dies, then one person would be convicted of murder while
the other can only be convicted of attempted murder. The one
whose victim died will receive a greater penalty although the two
had the same intent and criminal state of mind."' Here the
state of mind is the same but the result is different and thus so is
the punishment. The opposite is true with the self-defense
defense. Although the end result is the same as in a murder, the
culpability of the killer in self defense is different from the non-
self-defense murderer. One who kills in self defense is not
deserving of any punishment, while one who intentionally kills
withoutjustification or excuse deserves severe punishment. Here
the result is the same but the state of mind is different so the
punishment is different. With retribution, the result of a per-
son's actions does not determine the punishment; culpability
must be factored in as well.
Some who oppose capital punishment and the retributive
justification for it assert that by deliberately killing a convicted
murderer the state itself is just committing another killing." 3 A
better punishment would be life imprisonment; the state does
not kill and the murderer receives a severe punishment. One
abolitionist suggests that what is important for punishment is
that it be severe enough not to trivialize the crime or to do injus-
tice to the victim.1 14 Those who oppose this contention claim
that no amount ofjail time would equal the loss of the life of the
victim. Jeffrey Reiman suggests, however, that our system pres-
ently modifies the type of punishment given to convicted
criminals. Rapists are sent to jail although no amount of time in
jail could ever equal the injury caused to the victim by rape. 15
111. "If the crime is great enough, [the criminal] may be deprived of his
right to life .... The rights that we grant one another, on whatsoever basis, are
forfeited if we commit crimes." VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 108, at
261.
112. StephenJ. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497
(1974).
113. ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG &JOHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY. A
DEBATE (1983).
114. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering
van den Haag, 14 PHIL. AND PUB. ArF. 115 (1985).
115. Id. at 130-31.
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Jeffrey Reiman and Stephen Nathanson, another believer
that life imprisonment is a severe enough punishment for mur-
derers, suggest that most murderers could never deserve death.
Both argue that the state does not have the right to inflict the full
punishment upon most murderers because most murders are a
result of impoverished conditions that the state has the power to
control.1 6 Consequently, life imprisonment is the severest pun-
ishment that the state can inflict. Whether retribution justifies
capital punishment with non-retarded offenders is not an issue
that I need to resolve here. With mentally retarded offenders,
however, retribution cannot justify capital punishment.
b. Retribution and Mental Retardation
The retributive justification is especially disturbing when it is
used to justify the execution of mentally retarded defendants.
With retribution, the main concern is the culpability of a person.
The Supreme Court has stated that the inquiry into the appropri-
ateness of the death penalty is a question of "personal responsi-
bility and moral guilt."117 Furthermore, a critical aspect to
determining personal responsibility and moral guilt is the mental
state of the defendant."1 The relationship between mental
capacity and moral guilt is evident in the fact that moral develop-
ment is influenced by intelligence, opportunity for interaction
with others, living in an enriching environment, chronological
age, and mental age. 1 9 The importance of these factors is
demonstrated by the fact that, as a general rule, children are not
considered fully morally responsible until the age of eighteen. 2 '
In the case of children, each one of the factors influencing moral
development is limited due to the child's age and lack of experi-
ence. Similarly, these factors are limited with reference to a
mentally retarded person.1 21
This is not to say that a mentally retarded person cannot tell
what is "right" from what is "wrong." Mentally retarded people
116. Id at 131-32. See also STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE? THE
MORALITr OF PUNISHING BY DEATH (1987).
117. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (quoting Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
118. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
119. Leonore Boehm, MoralJudgment: Cultural and Subcultural Comparison
with Some Piaget's Research Conclusions, 1 INT'LJ. PSYCHOL. 143 (1966).
120. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). But see Victor L.
Streib, Death Penalty for Juveniles, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 613, 614-15 (1983) (281
offenders under the age of 18 have been executed).
121. This is not to suggest, however, that we must treat retarded people
like children. Rather this analogy was made to show how our legal system
recognizes these factors in assessing moral blameworthiness.
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know that certain actions are wrong but they are not adept at
figuring out why they are wrong.1 22 One researcher has likened
this to punishing a child two weeks after she has done something
wrong. The child does not have the cognitive capacity to appre-
ciate or recognize the link between her prior action and the
punishment.1 23
Moral reasoning develops over the years; it is not something
that we all know from our beginnings. The ability to make moral
judgments "flows from the ability to transcend the self and to see
the impact of behaviors and interactions as they relate to 'the
other."' 124 Such an ability is a complex process. Researchers
have found that a mentally retarded person's moral judgment is
comparable to that of a non-retarded person of the same mental
age 125 as determined by the intelligence quotient. Most mentally
retarded defendants have the mental age of a child much
younger than sixteen 126 and, as stated above, most children are
not considered fully morally responsible for criminal action.
Mentally retarded people also have a diminished capacity to
distinguish between blameworthy behavior and accidental behav-
ior.127 As a result, it is difficult for a mentally retarded person to
determine which of his actions are not acceptable. In a world
where violence is routinely displayed on television and in the
streets,121 it may be difficult for someone with a limited ability at
making moral judgments to determine which killings are bad
and which are not. A system should not hold a person to a moral
test that he does not understand.
Finally, retribution punishes people for what a court decides
are intentional actions or reckless actions evincing gross disre-
122. Reid, Unknowing Punishment, STUDENT LAW. 21 (May 1987).
123. See generally STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED
PEOPLE (1983).
124. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (Marjorie Gabain
trans., 1965) (1932).
125. J.E. Perry & D. Krebs, Role-Taking Moral Development, and Mental
Retardation, 136 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 95 (1980).
126. For example, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the case which held that mentally
retarded defendants could be executed under the Eighth Amendment, the
defendant had the mental age of a 6 1/2 year old.
127. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 1, at 430.
128. With the presence of video cameras and news stations at scenes of
crime and in international warfare, the chance that a mentally retarded person
could confuse those two different types of killings is highly possible. Both non-
retarded and retarded people may have difficulty understanding how killing in
war is different than killing on the streets. However, with their mental
capabilities and life experiences, non-retarded people can learn to at least
distinguish between the two even if they do not find them justified. Retarded
people, however, may not be able to make such a distinction.
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gard for the value of human life." 9 Mental state is a question of
fact decided by the fact finder.130 Due to all the variables
involved in mental retardation, it is difficult to determine that a
mentally retarded person is truly culpable of a capital offense.
Intending to kill someone or being reckless with regards to the
life of another person involves abilities that may be underdevel-
oped in mentally retarded people.
For a person to act intentionally or recklessly he must know
the probable consequences of a given action. If such knowledge
is lacking, then a person cannot expect a given result because he
is not aware that such a result will occur. This is a key factor in
the criminal culpability of a mentally retarded person. Mentally
retarded people have difficulty generalizing from what they have
learned. So even if a mentally retarded person understands right
from wrong in his limited environment, he has difficulty applying
what he has learned to new situations. Thus, a mentally retarded
person can expect a given result only when the rest of the sur-
rounding circumstances are as he had learned. When those cir-
cumstances are changed, a mentally retarded person has more
difficulty than others in transferring the effects of his actions to
his new environment.
Even those who argue that mentally retarded people can dis-
tinguish right from wrong in the abstract, do believe that men-
tally retarded people have trouble applying the abstract concepts
to specific factual settings.1 31 Consequently, it is difficult to form
an intent to produce a specific result. With such uncertainty, the
retributive justification is not acceptable with mentally retarded
people. We should not punish someone because "he deserves it"
if we do not know if he truly deserves it.
Even a confession from a mentally retarded person is not a
true representation of his mental state or culpability. A mentally
retarded person might say that he intended to kill even though
he did not. Mentally retarded people are prone to biased
responding; if a mentally retarded defendant thinks that an
officer or prosecutor wants to hear that she committed the crime
she is more likely than a non-retarded person to say that she
did.1 32 Although confessions are not the only factors considered
129. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
130. Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
131. Empirical Study: The Mentally Retarded Offender in Omaha Douglas
County, 8 CREIGHTON L. REv. 622, 646 (1975).
132. See generally Sigelman et. al., The Responsiveness of Mentally Retarded
Persons to Questions, 17 EDUC. & TRAINING MEmNALLY RETARDED 120 (1982);
Sigelman et. al., When in Doubt, Say Yes: Acquiescence in Interviews with Mentally
Retarded Persons, 19 MENTAL RETARDATION 53 (1980).
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by the finder of fact in capital cases, the presence of a confession
is highly influential in pretrial plea bargaining and in the trial
itself.
The only true justification for capital punishment can be ret-
ribution. One must deserve to die before one can be sentenced
to death. No other purpose, regardless of its efficacy, can mor-
ally justify the taking of a human's life. Whether one deserves to
die is a difficult question to answer. There are many factors
besides the circumstances surrounding the crime that make the
determination of culpability difficult at best. One's emotional,
psychological and mental histories are crucial to the determina-
tion of a culpable mental state. Mental retardation, both what we
understand about it and what we do not, creates great difficulty
for the determination of what one deserves. Until we can fully
comprehend the working of the retarded mind, determining
what a mentally retarded person deserves is a task that should not
be taken lightly. Since the possibility of executing a less than
fully culpable person is so great with mentally retarded people,
the death penalty is not a justified form of punishment as
imposed on that group of society.
VI. CONCLUSION
Punishment is a significant part of the American legal sys-
tem. Whether it is justified is crucial to its acceptance. The pur-
poses for punishment influence whether a particular
punishment will be tolerated by the American public. Of the
purposes for punishment, only retribution, and possibly general
deterrence if combined with retribution, could justify capital
punishment.
Whether these purposes truly justify capital punishment is
debatable. Whether someone truly deserves to die is difficult to
answer and thus calls into question the retributive justification.
Also, there is evidence that executions do not deter homicides
within the community and thus the general deterrence argument
is questionable too.
The focus of this essay, however, was the acceptability of the
execution of mentally retarded people. Even if capital punish-
ment can be justified through retribution or general deterrence
or by way of the two linked together, it cannot be justified when
imposed on mentally retarded defendants. The elements neces-
sary to be found guilty of a capital crime require a high degree of
knowledge on the part of the criminal. This knowledge requires
an understanding of the relationship between cause and effect
and an understanding of unacceptable behavior. Many mentally
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retarded people may not have this knowledge or the ability to
acquire this knowledge. Consequently, many mentally retarded
people could be found guilty of the criminal act but not be capi-
tally punishable.
Of the thirty-six states that allow capital punishment only
two exempt mentally retarded people from execution.13 3 The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the execution
of mentally retarded defendants is constitutional.' This is
astonishing. The acceptance of the death penalty as imposed on
the mentally retarded may be attributable to the misunderstand-
ings surrounding mental retardation. Additional understanding
of the mentally retarded may contribute to a reversal of this
thinking. That the courts are aware that mental retardation
diminishes a criminal's culpability is evident by the fact that
mental retardation may be considered a mitigating factor in sen-
tencing. Equating mental retardation, however, to a mitigating
factor is not sufficient.
Until the legal system truly understands people who are
mentally retarded, a punishment that is barely justifiable as
imposed on non-retarded people cannot be justified with respect
to retarded defendants. If death can be justified at all, it must be
reserved for only the most deserving of criminals. Mentally
retarded defendants are not the most deserving of criminals.
Mental retardation is a disability that affects one's learning and
impulse control. A mentally retarded person may not appreciate
the consequences of his actions or understand that his actions
are criminal. To punish an individual who does not understand
that his actions are wrong and to punish that individual because
he did them anyway, is to punish a person for being mentally
retarded. Such punishment is unacceptable.
133. These states are Georgia and Kentucky. See supra note 3.
134. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1987).
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